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THE GRAND BARGAIN: REVITALIZING
LABOR THROUGH NLRA REFORM AND
RADICAL WORKPLACE RELATIONS
MICHAEL M. OSWALT†
ABSTRACT
Amid steadily declining union density, debate has taken center
stage in the American labor movement regarding the potential—or
even utility—of reforming the National Labor Relations Act to
reverse the trend. This Note argues that such reform is possible,
through a grand legislative bargain nationalizing the so-called rightto-work regime in exchange for abolishing the NLRB election in
favor of the card-check union certification procedure. Using legal,
sociological, and radical democratic theory and examples, this Note
demonstrates that, counterintuitively, the right-to-work environment
can strengthen unions instead of weakening them. Both changes
therefore benefit labor.

INTRODUCTION
The seventieth anniversary of the National Labor Relations Act
1
(NLRA) prompted renewed reflection on its ability to effectively
govern relations between labor and management in the modern
workplace.2 For supporters of the American labor movement, the
Copyright © 2007 by Michael M. Oswalt.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2008; Duke Divinity School, M.T.S.
expected 2008; Haverford College, B.A. 2000. I am enormously grateful to Professor Catherine
Fisk for her encouragement, guidance, and support. This Note is dedicated to Professor Douglas
Davis at Haverford College. An earlier draft of this Note won first place in the 2006–07 Louis
Jackson National Student Writing Competition in Employment and Labor Law.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 225–26 (2005) (“[I]n 2005, the seventieth anniversary of the enactment of
the National Labor Relations Act[,] . . . the noble ideas of the NLRA seem quaint at best,
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3
2005 occasion was not a cause for celebration. Although surveys
showed that a majority of U.S. workers would vote for a union in
their workplace if an election were held,4 by 2006 the percentage of
5
private wage-earners in unions had shrunk to 7.4 percent, less than
6
one-third the level reported in the early 1970s. That the statute
valiantly proclaimed the protection of the right to self-organization to
7
be the “policy of the United States” served only as a sardonic
reminder of the gulf between the Act’s ideals and the everyday
realities of union organizing.8 Some commentators called for various
9
10
reforms of the Act, others for its repeal. Jonathan Hiatt, AFL-CIO

perhaps irrelevant or even hostile to labor’s interest.”); Union, Management Attorneys Disagree
on Significance of Recent NLRB Rulings, 103 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-1 (May 31, 2005)
(reporting on the American Bar Association’s Section of Labor and Employment Law
conference marking the seventieth year of the Act); Charles B. Craver, The National Labor
Relations Act at Seventy: Rapidly Approaching Irrelevance, PERSP. ON WORK, Fall 2005,
http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/Perspectives/onlinecompanion/Fall05-craver.htm (“The NLRA
has not kept pace with changing economic and sociological conditions. . . . This is why the Act
has become almost irrelevant to most employees.”).
3. See, e.g., Jack Rasmus, Reorganizing American Labor: A Reunification Proposal, Z
MAG., July–Aug. 2006, at 66, 66, available at http://zmagsite.zmag.org/JulAug2006/rasmus0706.
html (“At no time in the past 70 years have American workers and unions been under more
direct and intense attack by corporate America. Moreover, that attack continues to show signs
of becoming increasingly virulent and bold.”); Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act
at Seventy: The Decline of Unionization and Collective Bargaining in America, PERSP. ON
WORK, Fall 2005, http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/Perspectives/onlinecompanion/Fall05-getman.
htm (“There is little reason to celebrate. The NLRA no longer serves . . . its founding
principles. . . . [Seventy] years later, optimism has given way to cynicism and despair.”).
4. PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., LABOR DAY 2005: THE STATE OF WORKING
AMERICA 6 (2005), available at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/laborday/upload/ld2005_report.
pdf.
5. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2006, at 1 (Jan. 25, 2007),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
6. Eduardo Porter, Unions Pay Dearly for Success, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 3
(Business), at 4.
7. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)).
8. Representative, first-person accounts of the perils involved in organizing a union are
powerfully presented in MARY BETH MAXWELL & BRUCE NISSEN, AM. RIGHTS AT WORK,
SOME OF THEM ARE BRAVE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 1–2
(2003), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/
Some%20of%20them%20Are%20Brave.pdf. A comprehensive empirical discussion of the
same phenomenon is outlined in CHIRAG MEHTA & NIK THEODORE, UNDERMINING THE
RIGHT TO ORGANIZE: EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR DURING UNION REPRESENTATION CAMPAIGNS
8–16 (2005), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/
UROCUEDcompressedfullreport.pdf.
9. E.g., Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We Fix
It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 126–27, 138–46 (2003) (criticizing the Act and suggesting avenues for
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general counsel, questioned “how much of the Act [would] be left” by
its seventy-fifth anniversary, given the rate at which long-standing
labor law doctrines had been undermined by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) in just the previous twelve
11
months.
Despite differences of opinion regarding traditional labor law’s
potential to revive workplace democracy, the labor movement has
largely coalesced around a legislative proposal to reform the NLRA:
12
the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA). The AFL-CIO centers its
congressional lobbying efforts around the EFCA, to which the AFLCIO website devotes significant attention and is the subject of
aggressive petition, email, and organizational endorsement
campaigns.13
The EFCA is ambitious legislation. It would eliminate the
traditional secret-ballot NLRB election in favor of certifying a union
pursuant to a Board finding that a majority of employees have signed

reform); Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 185–206 (2001) (setting out various possible amendments to make
the Act more favorable to workers seeking to form a union); see also Dannin, supra note 2, at
234–40 (proposing a novel litigation strategy to reinvigorate the enforcement powers of the
NLRA).
10. E.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN, Will Labor Fare Better Under State Labor Relations
Law?, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASSOCIATION SERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
58TH ANNUAL MEETING 125, 126 (2006) (contending that national labor law, including the
NLRA, “has failed to give U.S. workers ways to obtain the labor representation and
participation that they want” and advocating state regulation of labor relations); Anton G.
Hajjar & Daniel B. Smith, National Labor Relations Board Interference with Private
Representation Agreements—Is Repeal of the National Labor Relations Act the Answer? 24
(May 13, 2004) (unpublished paper presented to the Pacific Coast Labor & Employment Law
Conference,
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/labor/newsletter/pp/fall06/hajjar.pdf)
(considering the ramifications of repealing the Act). Calls to repeal the Act, even emanating
from within the mainstream of the labor movement, were documented as long ago as the 1980s.
See Cathy Trost & Leonard M. Apcar, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a ‘Dead Letter,’
WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8 (reporting AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland’s suggestion to
repeal the NLRA).
11. Jonathan Hiatt, General Counsel, AFL-CIO, Address at the ABA Labor and
Employment Law Conference: 70th Anniversary Celebration of the National Labor Relations
Act (May 25, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/labor/newsletter/pp/summer05/
hiatt.html.
12. S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007).
13. AFL-CIO, The Employee Free Choice Act, http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/
voiceatwork/efca (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
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authorizations designating the union as its bargaining representative.
The EFCA would also provide for first-contract mediation and
arbitration if an employer and a union were unable to reach a
15
contract agreement within ninety days. And it would increase the
penalties assessed to employers who commit unfair labor practices
against employees during a union campaign or first-contract
negotiation, including treble back pay, civil penalties, and a
requirement that the NLRB seek a federal court injunction against an
employer it finds has significantly interfered with employee rights
during an organizing or first-contract campaign.16
Nonetheless, many question if any NLRA reform proposal—
beneficial to the labor movement or not—is legislatively viable,
regardless of which party controls the White House or Congress. In
meticulously tracing the roots of what she terms the “ossification of
17
labor law,” Professor Cynthia Estlund notes that “for many decades,
both organized labor and especially employers have had enough
support in Congress to block any significant amendment that either
group strongly opposes.”18 The bar for “enough support” is rather
low: “it means a minority that is big enough, well organized enough,
and committed enough to tie up a bill through the arcane
supermajority requirements of the Senate.”19 That labor law reform
provokes such committed opposition leads Estlund somewhat
drearily to conclude that labor’s best hope for change might be to

14. S. 1041 § 2 (proposing an amendment to section 9(c) of the NLRA); H.R. 800 § 2
(proposing the same amendment). This proposed procedure is commonly known as “cardcheck” or “majority sign-up.” See discussion infra Part I.
15. S. 1041 § 3 (proposing an amendment to section 8 of the NLRA); H.R. 800 § 3
(proposing the same amendment).
16. S. 1041 § 4 (proposing amendments to sections 10(1), 10(c), and 12 of the NLRA); H.R.
800 § 4 (proposing the same amendments).
17. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527, 1532–44 (2002) (noting a longstanding political impasse has blocked any major
congressional revision of the NLRA since 1959).
18. Id. at 1540.
19. Id. Indeed, although in the Democratic 110th Congress EFCA passed the House with a
sizable majority, its supporters failed to overcome a Senate filibuster. Even so, President
George W. Bush promised to veto the legislation, a move Congress probably would not have
been able to override. See Steven Greenhouse, Clash Nears in the Senate on Legislation Helping
Unions Organize, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at A16 (“The [EFCA] . . . fac[es] the threat of a
veto by the Bush administration . . . .”); Steven Greenhouse, Senate Republicans Block Bill on
Unionizing, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at A21 (“White House officials had vowed to veto the
[EFCA].”).
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20

rally public support for workers’ rights, eschewing legislative reform
efforts altogether.21
This Note suggests that major NLRA reform—reform calculated
to vivify the labor movement through revitalized organizing and
internal activism—is possible. A grand compromise between
entrenched labor and management interests can indeed be reached,
but only if the stakes are drastically raised. Labor must receive what
is central to its strategy and rhetoric, and business must receive what
is central to its anti-union, free-market ideology. The key is that the
reform management believes would cripple the American labor
movement is, in fact, vital to its survival. The “grand bargain” this
Note proposes would amend the NLRA to abolish the secret-ballot
22
union election in favor of a universal “card-check” procedure and
would nationalize the so-called “right-to-work” regime in force in
twenty-two states. Both changes, this Note demonstrates, are
beneficial to labor.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of card-check’s benefits
to workplace organizing efforts, showing why labor vigorously
supports the procedure and management strenuously opposes it. Part
II briefly traces the history of right-to-work, some conventional
research attesting to its deleterious effects on unions, and how the
legal gulf between the right-to-work and non-right-to-work models is
less stark than is commonly presumed. Part III explores how some
unions have defied conventional wisdom to achieve success in the
right-to-work setting. Finally, Part IV uses legal, sociological, and
political theory scholarship to argue that unions not only can survive
in a right-to-work environment—they can thrive. The regime,
counterintuitively, does not necessarily weaken unions—“right-towork” can strengthen them.

20. Estlund, supra note 17, at 1611. Unfortunately, Estlund may not have considered
evidence of bias in the media’s coverage of the labor movement, which might negatively affect
labor’s ability to shape public consciousness. See, e.g., Bradford Plumer, Production Values:
Figuring out What’s Wrong with the Media’s Coverage of Organized Labor, Mother Jones, Sept.
7, 2005, http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2005/09/laborcoverage.html (citing
empirical research suggesting that media coverage of strikes focuses primarily on how
consumers will be affected by the labor disputes).
21. Estlund, supra note 17, at 1611–12.
22. “Card-check” is a concept taken directly from the Employee Free Choice Act. See
S.1041, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (proposing an amendment to section 9(c) of the NLRA); H.R.
800, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (proposing the same amendment).
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I. CARD-CHECK IN UNION ORGANIZING
The phrase “card-check” refers to a process in which an
employer promises to recognize a union as the exclusive bargaining
representative if a majority of workers in a unit sign cards supporting
unionization.23 Sometimes a card-check pact couples with a more
general “neutrality agreement” or arrangement crafted by the union
24
to ease employer opposition during the organizing drive. For
instance, a neutrality agreement might require that the employer not
engage in certain speech or intimidation tactics while the union
collects cards, or it might allow organizers greater access to the
employer’s property.25
That card-check agreements circumvent the traditional NLRB
election does not detract from their legitimacy.26 Rather, consistent
with aspirations in the National Labor Relations Act promoting
27
workplace cooperation and harmony, courts have consistently held
that employers may voluntarily contract to recognize a union by
means other than an election, including a specified majority of signed
authorization cards.28 Indeed, courts will enforce a signed and fully
integrated card-check agreement against a recalcitrant employer.29

23. Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor
Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369,
383 (2001).
24. Id. at 377.
25. Id. at 380–85. The mere existence of a neutrality agreement does not foreclose the
possibility of a traditional NLRB election. Like any contract, its content will vary by the parties’
intent, thus a union seeking to circumvent the Board would have to specifically negotiate a cardcheck clause. See id. (discussing card-check as a negotiated alternative to an NLRB election, not
as the default).
26. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596–97 (1969) (describing a card-check
procedure as a valid means of designating a union as the exclusive bargaining representative).
27. See NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401–02 (1952) (“The National Labor
Relations Act is designed to promote industrial peace by encouraging the making of voluntary
agreements governing relations between unions and employers.”).
28. Card-check arrangements have been uniformly endorsed by the Board and courts. E.g.,
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150 v. NLRB, 361 F.3d 395, 399–400 (7th Cir. 2004);
NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 751 (7th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Broadmoor
Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238, 241–42 (9th Cir. 1978); MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 464,
464, 466 (1999).
29. See, e.g., Hotel & Rest. Employees Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561,
563, 568 (2d Cir. 1993) (enforcing card-check and neutrality agreements pursuant to section 301
of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act); Snow, 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 710 (1961)
(requiring an employer to honor the results of a card-check agreement), enforced, 308 F.2d 687
(9th Cir. 1962).
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In fact, card-check agreements have become the rule rather than
30
the exception in organizing campaigns. In 2005, card-check was the
genesis for more than 70 percent of newly unionized workers,
31
compared to just 5 percent in the mid-1980s.
AFL-CIO lobbyist Andy Levin succinctly captured the rationale
behind unions’ increasing reluctance to engage the formal NLRB
32
election process: “The NLRB (election route) is a death trap.”
Though perhaps overstated, in representation elections overseen by
the NLRB employers frequently and aggressively partake in both
legal and nonlegal anti-union tactics. A report by the University of
Illinois at Chicago’s Center for Urban Economic Development found
that in the lead-up to 2002 NLRB elections, 51 percent of employers
used bribery or favoritism to persuade workers to oppose the union,33
49 percent threatened to close a worksite if the union prevailed,34 91
percent required employees to attend anti-union meetings with
35
36
supervisors, and 30 percent fired workers allied with the union.
In contrast, the card-check paradigm lessens the likelihood and
opportunity for management to intimidate and coerce employees,
especially when card-check combines with an employer-neutrality
37
clause. As Stewart Acuff, the AFL-CIO’s organizing director
explained: “We prefer card check because people can do it off
premises, can do it in their homes, can do it without the employer
looking over their shoulder.”38 Statistics support Acuff’s anecdotal
experiences: 46 percent of workers involved in 2002 NLRB elections
reported having experienced employer coercion leading up to the
30. See, e.g., David Wessel, Some Workers Gain with New Union Tactics, WALL ST. J., Jan.
31, 2002, at A1 (“About 80% of the workers organized [by one international union] last year
never cast a ballot, instead persuading employers to accept workers’ written declarations that
they want a union.”).
31. Steven Greenhouse, Employers Sharply Criticize Shift in Unionizing Method to Card
from Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A9.
32. George Raine, A High-Stakes Labor Card Game: Organizing Strategy Has Hotel
Workers Avoid Secret Ballot, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2006, at D1 (quoting Andy Levin, of the
AFL-CIO).
33. MEHTA & THEODORE, supra note 8, at 9 tbl.2.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 15 tbl.3.
36. Id. at 5.
37. Hartley, supra note 23, at 383 (“[U]nion organizing success improves quite dramatically
when a neutrality agreement . . . combine[s] with a provision for card-check recognition.”).
38. Anya Sostek, Union: Yes or No? As State AFL-CIO Convention Comes to Pittsburgh,
Unions, Employers Push for Changes to Voting Procedures, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr.
4, 2006 (quoting Stewart Acuff, organizing director of the AFL-CIO).
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vote, while only 23 percent of workers engaged in card-check
campaigns reported that their supervisors pressured them not to sign
39
authorization cards. In turn, unions are significantly more likely to
40
prevail in card-check campaigns than in Board-sponsored elections.
Part of the proposal advanced in this Note would statutorily
formalize card-check, removing it from its framework as an
agreement between a union and employer. Tracking the language in
41
the EFCA, once the Board finds that a majority of employees in a
bargaining unit have signed cards designating the union as their
bargaining representative, the Board would be required to certify the
union, avoiding the traditional election. This aspect of the proposal
benefits the labor movement. The next Part discusses a trade-off,
nationalized “right-to-work,” which presumably benefits the business
community.
II. UNION SECURITY AND THE RIGHT-TO-WORK REGIME
Union security “refers to an agreement between an employer
and a union under which an employee must either join the union or
satisfy a financial obligation to the union as a condition of
employment.”42 The ultimate form of such security, in which an
employer agrees to hire only preexisting union members, was lawful

39. AM. RIGHTS AT WORK, FACT OVER FICTION: OPPOSITION TO CARD CHECK DOESN’T
ADD UP 2 (2006), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/
ARAWReports/IBFactOverFictFinal.pdf.
40. Sostek, supra note 38 (“Unions are successful a little more than half the time in formal
NLRB elections, [versus] nearly 80 percent with card checks.”).
41. Section 2 of the EFCA proposes amending section 9(c) of the NLRA to read:
[W]henever a petition shall have been filed by an employee or group of employees or
any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a majority of
employees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining wish to be
represented by an individual or labor organization for such purposes, the Board shall
investigate the petition. If the Board finds that a majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for bargaining has signed valid authorizations designating the individual
or labor organization specified in the petition as their bargaining representative and
that no other individual or labor organization is currently certified or recognized as
the exclusive representative of any of the employees in the unit, the Board shall not
direct an election but shall certify the individual or labor organization as the
representative . . . .
S. 1041, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); see also H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (proposing the same
amendment).
42. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, LABOR UNION LAW AND
REGULATION 423 n.1 (William W. Osborne, Jr. ed., 2003).
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43
under section 8(3) of the NLRA until 1947, when Congress revised
the Act through the Taft-Hartley amendments.44 Taft-Hartley
emerged partly in response to increasing attacks that this powerful
arrangement, known as the “closed shop,” discriminatorily barred
free employment45 and threatened individual liberty.46
But Congress also understood the union concern that Senator
Robert Taft explained, “[I]f there is not a closed shop those not in the
union will get a free ride [while] the union does the work get[ting] the
47
wages raised.” Thus, section 8(a)(3) of the amended Act continued
to sanction union-management partnerships that, in more limited
forms, sought to provide union security so that employees who
“shar[e] [in] the benefits of what unions are able to accomplish
through collective bargaining . . . pay their share of the cost.”48 For
instance, section 8(a)(3) allowed “union shop” agreements, under
which nonunion members could obtain initial employment but had to
become members within a certain period of time.49

43. Id. at 425 (“‘[N]othing in this [A]ct . . . shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership
therein . . . .’” (quoting the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000)))).
44. Id. at 427; see also Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch.120, sec. 101,
§ 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140–41 (1947) (amending the NLRA).
45. See S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 6 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407, 412 (1948) (“[T]he closed shop . . .
creates too great a barrier to free employment to be longer tolerated.”); ABA SECTION OF
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 42, at 426 (describing congressional debates in which
the closed-shop arrangements were seen as creating too high a barrier to trade to be tolerated).
46. The House Committee on Education and Labor stated rather hyperbolically that:
For the last 14 years, . . . the American Workingman has been deprived of his
dignity . . . . He has been cajoled, coerced, intimidated, and on many occasions beaten
up, in the name of the splendid aims set forth in Section 1 of the National Labor
Relations Act. His whole economic life has been subject to the complete domination
and control of unregulated monopolists.
H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 4 (1947), reprinted in NLRB, supra note 45, at 292, 295.
47. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 42, at 426 (quoting 93
CONG. REC. 5089 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 45, at 1422); see also S. REP. NO. 80105, at 6 (1947), reprinted in NLRB, supra note 45, at 407, 413 (giving “employers and unions . . .
the right to continue [union shop] arrangements” to “promote[] stability by eliminating ‘free
riders’”).
48. S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 6 (1947), reprinted in NLRB, supra note 45, at 407, 412; accord
NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740–41 (1963) (same).
49. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(2000) (“[N]othing in this [Act] . . . shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with
a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after
the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment . . . .”).
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In section 14(b), however, Congress allowed states to restrict or
50
prohibit union security agreements altogether, carving out an
exception to the NLRA’s default preemption rule.51 Twenty-two
states have exercised this power, and their resulting statutes comprise
52
what is colloquially known as the “right-to-work.” Although states
differ in the extent to which they utilize 14(b) to restrict security
agreements, in general, a right-to-work law “forbid[s] unions and
employers from conditioning employment on any form of union
‘membership,’ even if a majority of employees in the bargaining unit
have selected the union as their exclusive bargaining
representative.”53 In so doing, state right-to-work laws—either
explicitly or as interpreted judicially—bar most union security
54
agreements, including agency fee arrangements, which obligate
nonmembers to pay the equivalent of union dues and fees for the
union’s services.55
Those allied with the labor movement vigorously oppose the
right-to-work regime. At the state level, votes on right-to-work spur
aggressive union countermobilizations56 that often recast the

50. See § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2000) (“Nothing in this [Act] shall be construed as
authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.”). The constitutionality of section 14(b) was
upheld in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 531,
537 (1949), and American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 540,
542 (1949).
51. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 42, at 516.
52. The following states have enacted “right-to-work” provisions: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. app. G at 915–29.
53. Id. at 518.
54. Id. at 518 n.518 (“With the exception of seven states[,] . . . all of the right-to-work states
expressly prohibit agreements conditioning employment on either membership or payment of
dues or fees. In six of these states, either the courts or the Attorneys General have interpreted
the right-to-work laws to prohibit agency shop arrangements.”). In Nevada, the seventh, the
state Supreme Court has held that the state’s right-to-work law does not prohibit a union from
charging nonmembers a fee in exchange for grievance representation. Cone v. Nev. Serv.
Employees Local 1107, 998 P.2d 1178, 1181-82 (Nev. 2000).
55. See Amalgamated Ass’n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, Div. 1225 v. Las
Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line Inc., 319 F.2d 783, 784 (9th Cir. 1963) (“[An agency shop]
agreement provides that employees who do not join the union will pay the regular initiation fee
and dues to the union, and that if they do not make these payments, the employer will discharge
them.”).
56. See, e.g., Posting of Mike Hall to AFL-CIO Now Blog, Working Families Celebrate
Victory in New Hampshire, http://blog.aflcio.org/?p=303 (Mar. 23, 2006) (“On March 22, after a
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57
legislation as the “right-to-work for less.” The modified moniker, in
fact, references a phenomenon borne out by data. The average
worker in a right-to-work state earns $5,333 less annually than
58
workers in other states. Moreover, an analysis of Census Bureau
statistics shows that both per capita income and union density
negatively correlate at statistically significant levels with right-to-work
59
laws.
Union hostility to right-to-work is not just a reaction to such
points. At a very basic level, the right-to-work paradigm threatens a
movement that owes its existence to its ability to collect dues from its
members. In states where union security agreements can exist, the
60
union shop and a steady stream of weekly or biweekly dues follow.
In contrast, where right-to-work reigns, the union shop is outlawed
and free riders may flourish, enjoying the contractual benefits of
union membership without actually paying for them. Indeed, as the

working families’ mobilization plan that showed lawmakers just how deeply right to work laws
go against the grain of New Hampshire voters, the latest RTW proposal again failed.”).
57. E.g., THE TRUTH ABOUT RIGHT TO WORK FOR LESS: RIGHT TO WORK HURTS
EVERYONE, http://www.aflcio.org/issues/legislativealert/stateissues/upload/rtw.pdf (last visited
Nov. 27, 2007). President Harry Truman said: “You will find some people saying that they are
for the so-called right to work law, but they also believe in unions. This is absurd. . . . It is like
saying you are for motherhood but against children.” See Open Shops in the 21st Century
Workplace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Education and the Workforce, 106th Cong. 3–4 (2000) (statement of Tim Roemer, Ranking
Member, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the
Workforce) (quoting President Truman).
58. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AVERAGE ANNUAL PAY
BY STATE AND INDUSTRY, 2001, at tbl.1 (2002), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/
annpay.txt (calculated by author).
59. Raymond Hogler & Steven Shulman, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Right-toWork: Colorado’s Labor Peace Act and Its Implications for Public Policy, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
871, 928 & n.252 (1999).
60. There is, however, an intermediate step. Section 302(c)(4) of the NLRA sanctions an
arrangement called “check-off,” where an employer will automatically deduct from an
employee’s pay the dues owed to the union and transfer the dues directly to the union. ABA
SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 42, at 530. Thus, while “union security”
refers to an employer-union agreement to ensure workers pay dues as a condition of
employment, “check-off” is a means of facilitating such payments. Id. at 531. Because the
agreements are separate, a union may have a security agreement without check-off, or even
check-off without union security. Id. Unions in non-right-to-work states will attempt to
negotiate for both union security and check-off, ensuring a constant and efficient flow of dues to
the union each pay period. Kenneth Bullock, Official Time as a Form of Union Security in
Federal Sector Labor-Management Relations, 59 A.F.L. REV. 153, 160–61 (2007) (“Automatic
dues check-off is a great boon to union officials, since it relieves them of the time-consuming
duty of collecting dues while ensuring a steady stream of funds. Dues check-off appears in the
overwhelming majority of private and public labor contracts . . . .”).
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61
duty of fair representation is owed to all union-represented
employees, including nonmembers, unions must expend resources
advocating for individual nonmembers, but are prohibited from
62
charging for those services.
Yet, even granting the unique budgetary constraints faced by
63
unions in right-to-work states, labor’s troubles in such states cannot
be blamed entirely on section 14(a). Given a number of judicial
interpretations, union security is simply never complete, no matter
the state. For example, even the vaunted “union shop” agreement,
which ensures full membership, provides only partial security. The
courts have interpreted “membership” narrowly, requiring employees
to satisfy certain financial obligations to the union like basic dues and
initiation fees, but not requiring them to join64 or support the union’s

61. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (“[T]he exclusive agent’s statutory authority to
represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests
of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with
complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.”).
62. Judge Mikva of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit lamented this
state of affairs:
Fifty years ago . . . free riders simply benefitted from [union] accomplishments . . .
such as higher wages or improved working conditions. Today, free riders can invoke
union efforts on their particular behalf . . . and thus affirmatively deplete the union’s
treasury. The difference is like that between the house guest who warms himself
beside the fireplace, and the guest who demands that the thermostate [sic] be turned
up. In short, the problem of free riders has become more pronounced as the
responsibilities of unions have grown.
In the interest of “fair representation,” however, the NLRB has frustrated union
efforts to recoup these costs from free riders. In Hughes Tool Co., 104 NLRB 318
(1953), for example, the Board held that a union could not charge nonunion
employees a flat rate for handling their grievances, or a graduated fee for handling
arbitrations.
Int’l Union of the United Ass’n of Journeymen Locals 141, 229, 681, and 706 v. NLRB, 675 F.2d
1257, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Mikva, J., dissenting). But cf. Cone v. Nev. Serv. Employees
Union/SEIU Local 1107, 998 P.2d 1178, 1181–82 (Nev. 2000) (holding that a union’s practice of
“charging nonmembers fees for individual [grievance] representation” did not violate Nevada’s
right-to-work laws because the state statute authorized nonunion members to act on their own
behalf and pay for their own representation).
63. For 2005, the five states with the lowest levels of unionization were right-to-work states:
Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. See Press Release, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, supra note 5, at 11 tbl.5. For a detailed history of labor’s decline and weakness
in the right-to-work states, see generally Raymond Hogler, The Historical Misconception of
Right to Work Laws in the United States: Senator Robert Wagner, Legal Policy, and the Decline
of American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101 (2005).
64. See NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (“It is permissible to
condition employment upon membership, but membership, insofar as it has significance to
employment rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues.
‘Membership’ as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core.”).
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political efforts, external organizing ventures, or any other activities
unrelated to “bargaining, contract administration, or grievance
65
adjustment.” Thus, though the union shop assures a minimum
financial infusion each month, dollars can fluctuate as members join
or drop out, just like under the right-to-work regime. In turn, the
union must still service its “members” to avoid apathy, stave off
66
decertification efforts, and justify external organizing and political
67
lobbying expenses.
Every union, in a right-to-work state or not, must therefore
navigate economic trade-offs. A union in a right-to-work state must
compensate for the possibility of a more precipitous drop in
resources, but as that same union approaches the vigor of full
membership, differences between it and a union in a non-right-to68
work state become almost wholly rhetorical. A strong union is a
strong union in any state.
In all, right-to-work laws surely affect unions’ fortunes in
tangible ways. But to attribute labor’s difficulties in right-to-work
states solely or even primarily to section 14(a) may be simplistic.
III. DEFYING ASSUMPTIONS IN THE RIGHT-TO-WORK SETTING
This Note’s challenge is not to show that right-to-work’s negative
impact on unions is overstated or does not really exist, but rather to
demonstrate that, properly oriented, unions can prosper in a right-towork environment. Indeed, right-to-work can be beneficial. Because
right-to-work is perceived to weaken unions and nicely complements
business’s free-market schema, labor’s embrace of it could expose a
rare space for legislative reform, allowing unions to secure the
benefits of a national card-check procedure.69 This Part illustrates how
unions can thrive in a right-to-work setting.

65. Commc’ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 738, 762–63 (1988).
66. Indeed, workers disgruntled with the union may petition for its decertification.
National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
67. See Commc’ns Workers, 487 U.S. at 738, 762–63 (forbidding a union from spending
mandatory agency fees on such expenses).
68. See, e.g., James W. Kuhn, Right-to-Work Laws—Symbols or Substance?, 14 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 587, 588 (1961) (“If all workers within a bargaining unit always sought
membership and willingly paid their dues, right-to-work laws could have little significance for
collective bargaining.”).
69. This proposal also has a certain inherent logic. Many would probably concede that in
an ideal system of labor-management relations, those wanting union representation should be
able to achieve that goal efficiently, whereas those who do not should not be forced to pay for it.
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A. The Promise of Internal Activism
Amid conspicuously low unionization rates in right-to-work
70
71
states, some unions defy conventional wisdom and function well
even in the absence of union security. Right-to-work Nevada boasts a
relatively high unionization rate, equal to the rate in Pennsylvania,
higher than the rate in Maryland, and a shade below the rate in
Massachusetts—three states that allow for the union shop.72 Overall,
Nevada’s unions represented 158,000 workers in 2005,73 92 percent of
74
whom voluntarily maintained their union membership. In fact,
Culinary Workers Local 226, the Las Vegas hotel local of UNITE
HERE,75 is one of the largest and fastest-growing local unions in the
United States, having doubled its membership since the 1980s even as
76
hotel union membership declined nationally. United Electrical (UE)
Local 1111, though located in non-right-to-work Wisconsin, chooses
not to bargain for union security yet presently maintains 97 percent
membership.77
What accounts for such anomalies? The robustness of unions like
Local 226 in Nevada and Local 1111 in Wisconsin could be a result of
a conscious tendency towards internal activism, a trait some have
suggested is critical to interior union strength. As labor journalist Abe
Raskin opined, “[R]eorganizing the organized must transcend all

70. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 5, at 11 tbl.5 (listing
unionization rates by state).
71. See, e.g., BARBARA S. GRIFFITH, THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN LABOR: OPERATION
DIXIE AND THE DEFEAT OF THE CIO 171–73 (1988) (concluding that the failure of “Operation
Dixie,” the CIO’s attempt to organize the southern right-to-work states en masse in the late
1940s, was inevitable).
72. In 2005, 13.8 percent of Nevada’s workers were unionized, compared to 13.8 percent in
Pennsylvania, 13.3 percent in Maryland, and 13.9 percent in Massachusetts. Press Release,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 5, at 11 tbl.5.
73. Id.
74. In 2005, 145,000 Nevada workers represented by unions voluntarily maintained their
membership. Id.
75. UNITE HERE was formed in 2004 when the former Union of Needletrades, Industrial
and Textile Employees (UNITE) merged with the former Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union (HERE). See UNITE HERE!, What is UNITE HERE?, http://
www.unitehere.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
76. Harold Meyerson, Las Vegas as a Workers’ Paradise, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2004, at
38; Anastasia H. Prokos, Employment and Labor Relations in Nevada, SOCIAL HEALTH OF
NEVADA (2004), available at http://www.unlv.edu/centers/cdclv/healthnv/labor.html.
77. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America (UE) Local 1111, Who We
Are, http://www.ue1111.org/whoweare.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
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other union priorities if those now inside but divorced from any sense
78
of genuine involvement are to become bona fide trade unionists.”
79
Indeed, Local 226’s resurgence coincided with the arrival of
UNITE HERE’s President John Wilhelm, who had orchestrated a
successful union drive at Yale University using a novel approach—
80
allowing the workers to act as organizers. Wilhelm brought this
model to Las Vegas, instituting workers’ committees empowered to
organize street rallies and union events without major interference
81
from paid staff. With a new sense of purpose, the committees turned
militant, culminating with a strike at the Horseshoe casino in 1989
that led to hundreds of arrests.82 In preparation for the 2002 contract
negotiations, the committees organized a rally attended by over
83
twenty-three thousand local members at a Las Vegas sports arena.
Local 1111, for its part, attributes high membership rates to a
“constant shop-floor presence . . . on the lookout for young workers
willing to stand up to management . . . send[ing] them to its shop
steward training program to develop their ability to be an effective
84
voice for their co-workers.” Journalist Tom Wetzel, who has
conducted hundreds of interviews with union workers in the right-towork state of Iowa, reported that peer pressure on the shop floor
buoys strong union membership: “If a worker refused to join the
union, co-workers would refuse to lend him or her [tools] or do other
favors that make life on the job more bearable. The attitude was: ‘If
you won’t support us, you’re on your own, Jack. But if you do support
us, we’ll watch your back.’”85

78.

A.H. Raskin, New Directions for the AFL-CIO, NEW MGMT., Winter 1986, at 11, 12–

13.
79. During the 1980s, workers at six hotels decertified from the union, and the union’s
health-care plan approached bankruptcy. Meyerson, supra note 76, at 39.
80. See id. at 39–40 (describing the beginning of the union’s reconstruction under
Wilhelm).
81. See id. at 40 (extolling Wilhelm’s formation of “a new kind of union” based on workers’
committees).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Tom Wetzel, Unionism and Workers’ Liberation, Z MAG., May 31, 2006, http://www.
zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?itemID=10351.
85. Id.
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B. Business Unionism and Its Evolution
Because certain unions have found some success in the right-towork environment using tactics some theorize should indeed be
helpful does not mean that the experiences of, for example, Local 226
can be replicated nationally, or even anywhere else. In fact, so-called
“labor realists” disparage attempts at internal organizing as circular
efforts that merely reactivate the already activated.86 Members, the
“realists” have argued, receive the quality of unionism they demand,
87
and little can be done to alter their levels of involvement.
Such thinking may have helped to usher in the era of “business
unionism” in the 1970s and 1980s, under which unions hoped to parry
88
business animus and reverse shrinking rolls by adopting less activist
89
and more conciliatory postures. Unions crafted the approach both to
ease management opposition to labor law reform and to convince
employers that increased productivity and efficiency could best be
achieved through cooperation with labor.90
The strategy failed.91 Rather than join with unions, employers
simply avoided them, a choice that seemed to guarantee higher
92
profits without the inconvenience of partnership. In response,
instead of reversing course, many unions quixotically adopted an even
less activist stance—muting external organizing efforts,93 discouraging
rank-and-file activism in existing unions, and fostering workers’

86. ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, ROBUST UNIONISM 101–09 (1991).
87. Id. at 101.
88. In 1972, then AFL-CIO president George Meany astonishingly remarked: “Why should
we worry about organizing. . . . Frankly, I used to worry about the membership, about the size of
the membership. But quite a few years ago, I just stopped worrying about it, because to me, it
doesn’t make any difference.” RICK FANTASIA & KIM VOSS, HARD WORK 125 (2004).
89. Professor Ian Robinson described the strategy this way: “[U]nions would downplay
their adversarial traditions, and become partners in the intensifying international competitive
struggle. Labor’s contribution to this partnership would be greater flexibility in workplace
organization, and the encouragement of productivity-enhancing employee ‘voice.’” Ian
Robinson, Neoliberal Restructuring and U.S. Unions: Toward Social Movement Unionism?, 26
CRITICAL SOC. 109, 127 (2000).
90. STEVEN H. LOPEZ, REORGANIZING THE RUST BELT 4 (2004).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 5.
93. The United Auto Workers, for example, shunned new, nonunion auto parts
contractors, and local officials of the United Food and Commercial Workers reshaped their
jurisdictional boundaries so that they could discontinue organizing department stores.
FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 88, at 125.
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94
dependence on paid union staff. Workers, in turn, began to view
unions as a service they might consider purchasing, as opposed to a
collective movement they might join.95
But as sociologists observed that organized labor had become
more like an institutionalized interest group than a movement, some
unions began to change.96 Shifting away from the failed values of
business unionism, activists sought to transform the goals and tactics
of organizing, as well as the roles of current union members.97
Campaigns would treat unions not as a commodity to be sold, but as a
vehicle for solidarity in service to collective action in the workplace
and in society.98 This change would require radically new levels of
commitment, courage, and participation by current members, who
needed schooling in methods of direct action and remolding in the
ethics of community mindedness and movement politics.99 Dubbed
“social movement unionism,” the new philosophy would also rely on
“corporate” or “comprehensive” campaigns, which try to turn a
company’s social network of customers, investors, board members,
and even religious allies against it by unearthing and publicizing
embarrassing or hypocritical corporate facts and practices.100 Social
movement unionism additionally would attempt to expand the arena
of conflict into the greater community and society, often linking an
organizing campaign at a particular firm to a social justice issue
generally.101 Emphasizing surprising, creative, and multiple tactics, the
experimentalism fostered by social movement unionism sparked the

94. LOPEZ, supra note, 90 at 59.
95. Id.
96. See Kim Voss & Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union
Revitalization in the American Labor Movement, 106 AM. J. OF SOC. 303, 304 (2000) (discussing
the “revitalization” of unions, specifically in the ways they have “begun to organize new
members, using a wide variety of confrontation tactics, including massive street demonstrations,
direct action, worker mobilization, sophisticated corporate campaigns, and circumvention of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election process”).
97. Id. at 312–13.
98. FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 88, at 127.
99. Id. at 127–28.
100. Id. at 128–29.
101. Id. at 128, 131.
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102
Comprehensive campaigns remain
card-check innovation.
ubiquitously coupled with demands for card-check agreements.103
The Service Employees International Union’s (SEIU) Justice for
Janitors (J for J) campaign in Los Angeles is probably the
104
paradigmatic example of social movement unionism. Combining
105
shrewd corporate research, the media, and escalating guerilla tactics
ranging from health and safety inspections to street theater and
outright trespass,106 J for J showcased a torrent of public support and
107
collective activism unseen since the 1930s. In just two years, J for J
helped 90 percent of Los Angeles’s high-rise janitors gain the wages
and benefits of a collectively bargained agreement.108 Perhaps J for J’s
greatest accomplishment, however, was in allowing an unprecedented
level of activism by the janitors themselves. As summarized by
sociologists Rick Fantasia and Kim Voss:

[T]he campaign uncovered unexpected levels of solidarity and
daring on the part of Los Angeles’s immigrant janitors. Far from
being the docile wage slaves that many union officials predicted and
that employers smugly expected, immigrant janitors proved to be
quite militant, capable of quickly marshalling support not only
among their fellow janitors but also among family, friends, and
neighbors. Everyone, from employer-side lawyers to old-guard
officials to the J for J staff, was astonished at these workers’

102. See id. at 129 (“[S]ocial movement unionism is able and willing to look beyond the
traditional and routinized form of labor recognition relied on for so long by U.S. unions, the
formal NLRB election. Using either political pressure or a corporate campaign, or both, social
movement unionism is prepared to push for . . . ‘card-check recognition’ . . . .”).
103. See id. (“As part of this more militant strategy, unions often ask community or religious
leaders to certify the card count.”).
104. Id. at 134.
105. SEIU initially hired a full-time researcher assigned the sole task of uncovering the
ownership and management architecture of Los Angeles commercial cleaning companies. Later
projects revealed that the salient industry power brokers were not small subcontractors, but
large international corporations, which were much more vulnerable to public opinion and social
disruption. Id. at 139–40.
106. As portrayed in the movie Bread and Roses starring Adrien Brody and directed by Ken
Loach, janitors cleaned a mock office in the middle of rush hour, shutting down traffic. BREAD
AND ROSES (Alta Films S.A. 2000). The J for J campaign also engaged in “shaming rituals,” for
instance, crashing high-level business meetings, chanting loudly, and throwing bags of trash
around the room. FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 88, at 142.
107. FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 88, at 144.
108. Id.
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willingness to overtake the paid J for J staff members in their
109
intensity and commitment.

Fresh from J for J and other similarly successful campaigns,
SEIU quickly grew dissatisfied by the AFL-CIO’s lack of financial
110
and strategic commitment to new organizing ventures. SEIU and
seven other unions formed a new federation called “Change to Win,”
which the unions claimed would embody an even more aggressive and
worker-fueled approach to organizing.111
C. Social Movement Unionism: Implications for the Right-to-Work
Setting
The advent of Change to Win, the massive import placed on
card-check agreements,112 and the demonstrated success of social
movement unionism113 might portend a turning point in American
labor organizing. The retreat from the conciliatory, professionalized
ethic of business unionism may be complete, while the shift towards
the creative, adversarial, and amateurized philosophy of social
114
movement unionism may be total.
This possible crux in labor organization has crucial implications
for unions’ ability to survive in the right-to-work environment.
Stemming from social theorist Erving Goffman’s hypothesis that the
levels and forms of participation in organizational structures can

109. Id. at 144–45.
110. Steven Greenhouse, Five Unions to Create a Coalition on Growth, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2005, at A12.
111. Steven Greenhouse, Breakaway Unions Start a New Federation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2005, at A17.
112. The agreements themselves are often achieved through the threat or use of a
comprehensive campaign. See David Moberg, Paradigm Shift, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 2006, at 41,
42 (recognizing law Professor James Brudney’s argument that “unions are changing the model
for winning recognition . . . by using direct action to gain employer neutrality and card check
rights”).
113. See, e.g., Robert Bussel, Southern Organizing in the Post-Civil Rights Era: The Case of
S. Lichtenberg, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 528, 535 (1999) (discussing how the use of
comprehensive campaign tactics, including gathering support of the local faith community,
training workers to use collective power, and broadening the campaign to encompass issues of
gender inequality led to the union’s victory after two earlier campaigns, which did not utilize
such a comprehensive strategy, were defeated); Paul Jarley & Cheryl L. Maranto, Union
Corporate Campaigns: An Assessment, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 505, 519 (1990) (discussing
how corporate campaign tactics present a serious new challenge to employers).
114. See generally BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE:
A LABOR PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN BUSINESS (1992) (noting a trend in the labor movement
pushing unions to become more participatory with respect to their members).
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instigate or hinder levels of activism in other organizations later on,
sociology Professor Linda Markowitz has studied how organizing
strategies influence workers after campaigns end.116 Markowitz closely
117
followed two successful organizing campaigns. One, at Bob’s
Grocery Stores, relied primarily on paid union staff to stage the
campaign, while the other, at Geofelt Manufacturing, trained workers
in organizing techniques and encouraged their participation in the
drive.118 Both campaigns sharply restricted worker participation in the
protracted contract negotiations that followed.119
Workers at Bob’s reported feelings of dissatisfaction with the
union and generalized helplessness during the talks.120 Lacking the
experiences and training that might have been assimilated through
active organizing, the workers foundered, trading agency for
marginalization by failing to learn about their rights and neglecting
121
opportunities to push for change within the union or company. Half
reasoned against participation by anemically asserting that “activism
was not part of their role as a ‘union member.’”122 Explained one
worker: “I don’t need to become involved. We pay people to do
123
that. . . . If they’re doing their jobs, I shouldn’t have to participate.”
Workers at Geofelt were similarly frustrated that the union had
124
excluded them from contract talks, but responded quite differently.
Five workers who had been extremely active in the organizing
campaign formed an informal committee to persuade co-workers that
the union was “untrustworthy” and had abandoned them.125 The
committee decided to try to replace the union with a rival, going so
126
far as to research the official decertification process with the NLRB.

115. See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
EXPERIENCE 22 (1974) (describing the way in which experiences provide “frameworks” which
the actor then uses to view future events).
116. See LINDA MARKOWITZ, WORKER ACTIVISM AFTER SUCCESSFUL UNION
ORGANIZING 83 (2000) (noting Goffman’s claim that organizational structures differently
impact individuals’ responses to those organizations).
117. Id. at 12.
118. Id. at 105.
119. Id. at 131.
120. Id. at 152.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 152–53.
124. Id. at 157.
125. Id. at 157–58.
126. Id. at 158.
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Markowitz stresses that “what is notable is that the action these
employees took to redress their dissatisfaction imitated the action
they had engaged in to create a union. Because they had learned only
the specific skills associated with conducting an organizing drive, they
127
began another organizing campaign to replace the union.” That is,
workers used the skills they had been taught.
Markowitz’s research would seem to refute the labor realist
perspective, which holds that levels of union member activism are
indigenous and immune to manipulation. Instead, in workers’ minds,
the meanings and expectations of union membership perhaps evolve
through experience.128 If so, the activism and collective spirit of
Nevada’s Local 226 is not anomalous and could be replicated
elsewhere. The burgeoning social justice unionism model exemplified
by J for J is not just an effective campaign strategy but a blueprint for
union strength in the postcontract period. And innovators like
Jennifer Gordon, whose “Workplace Project” conditions legal
services on participation in organizing activities,129 are shaping a
consciousness that could undergird a new brand of internal unionism.
In short, unions can survive in the right-to-work setting. Some already
do. Social movement unionism primes a new generation of union
members to embody the activist spirit essential to union life in a post–
union security world.
IV. THE UNION BENEFITS OF RIGHT-TO-WORK
Having suggested that the presence of a vibrant membership
undermines the conventional presumption that right-to-work
necessarily saps union strength, this Note shows that the right-towork setting can actually benefit the labor movement.
A. Suppressed Activism and the Core of the Union Shop
Labor’s allies have not always viewed union security agreements
as desirable to the movement. Samuel Gompers, founder of the
American Federation of Labor, once said that “the workers in
America adhere to voluntary institutions in preference to compulsory
systems which are not only impractical but a menace to their welfare

127. Id.
128. See id. at 176 (“Through the process of organizing, workers develop frameworks that
set the stage for future interactions between the union and the workforce.”).
129. JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS 198 (2005).
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130
and their liberty.” And even the most ardent unionist might secretly
concede attorney Selwyn Torff’s observation that “there is something
disquieting about any organization that demands that the law give it
131
the right to compel where it has failed to persuade.”
The few who believe that labor would be strengthened by
abandoning union security argue that the agreements foster a
detached leadership out of touch with the membership. This is U.S.
Representative Bob Goodlatte’s view: “[U]nions are alive and well in
right-to-work states, but there is a very significant difference that I
argue improves the unions. . . . [If] members aren’t satisfied, they can
vote with their feet and walk away. . . . [I]t makes the leadership of
132
the union more responsive to the members.”
Indeed, simple logic suggests that when dues are guaranteed,
133
attentive member servicing may not be, cultivating a frustrated and
apathetic rank and file. The right-to-work environment, alternatively,
stands in sharp contrast. When dues are linked to member
satisfaction, leadership’s responsiveness embodies a special urgency,134
as intimated by Representative Goodlatte. In fact, labor historian
Nelson Litchenstein describes 1930s unionism, which lacked union
security entirely, as bustling with internal activism: “Everyday, local
leaders faced the task of justifying the union’s existence to the rank
and file to retain their loyalty . . . . Grievance battles were the order
of the day, and local officers went about their jobs in an aggressive
and energetic manner.”135 From the individual member’s perspective,
this servicing incentive might be viewed as an advantage of the rightto-work regime. From the union’s perspective, it might not be.

130. Open Shops in the 21st Century Workplace: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Education and the Workforce, supra note 57
(statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte of Virginia (quoting Samuel Gompers)); see, e.g., Lawrence
W. Reed, Labor Freedom Makes Sense, IDEAS ON LIBERTY, Feb. 2003, at 14, 15 (discussing the
negative economic consequences of compulsory unionism).
131. Selwyn H. Torff, The Case for Voluntary Union Membership, 40 IOWA L. REV. 621, 626
(1955).
132. Open Shops in the 21st Century Workplace: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Education and the Workforce, supra note 57
(statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte).
133. See PAUL SULTAN, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: A STUDY IN CONFLICT 123 (1958)
(“Under compulsory union provisions, leadership becomes further entrenched and increasingly
indifferent to the wishes of the rank and file.”).
134. See id. at 122 (“[T]he employee must be allowed some effective device for showing his
disapproval of union policies. The only effective way . . . is to withhold financial support from
the union . . . .”).
135. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR’S WAR AT HOME 22 (2003).
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The union might be wrong. Servicing indeed imposes
administrative costs and burdens, which may be higher in right-towork states as unions try to enhance worker satisfaction and minimize
free-riding. Such added costs are often cited as evidence that the
136
right-to-work model hurts unions. The member servicing and
interactions spurred by right-to-work could also be viewed as
opportunities, however, and here radical democratic theory proves
instructive.
B. The Radical Opportunities of Member Servicing
Political theorists have long identified a progressive atrophy in
137
Americans’ civic and political engagement. According to Princeton
theorist Jeffrey Stout, if the rise of such arms-length democracy has
an antidote, it is embedded in the honesty of a decentralized, face-toface conversation. Indeed, for Stout, democratic activism resides in
the “continuing social process of holding one another responsible . . . .
The democratic practice of giving and asking for ethical reasons . . . is
where the life of democracy principally resides.”138 In Stout’s terms, a
political culture that restricts democratic practice to passive
acceptance of shallow sound bites and a trip to the voting booth every
two to four years breeds detachment and apathy—while scattered,
impromptu, informal, reasoned conversations energize civic activity:
The social practices that matter most directly to democracy, as I
have argued at length, are the discursive practices of ethical
deliberation and political debate. The discursive exchange essential
to democracy is likely to thrive only where individuals identify to
some significant extent with a community of reason-givers. At the
local level, this may be the community constituted by arguments
over who does the dishes, what to do with the garbage we produce,

136. See, e.g., AFL-CIO, Right to Work for Less, http://www.aflcio.org/issues/
legislativealert/stateissues/work/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2007) (“[R]ight to work laws just aren’t
fair to dues-paying members. If a nonunion worker is fired illegally, the union must use its time
and money to defend him or her, even if that requires going through a costly legal process.
Everyone benefits, so all should share in the process.”).
137. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNUM, BOWLING ALONE 46 (2000) (“[S]ince the mid-1960s, the
weight of the evidence suggests, despite the rapid rise in levels of education Americans have
become . . . roughly 40 percent less engaged in party politics and indeed in political and civic
organizations of all sorts.”). In a modern context, DeTocqueville’s observation that American
democracy produces “an all-pervading and restless activity, a superabundant force,” SULTAN,
supra note 133, at 112 (quoting DeTocqueville), seems rather quaint.
138. JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 6 (2004).
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how the police are behaving, and what should be covered in a high
139
school curriculum.

Thus, for Stout the true democratic activist is marked less by an
interest in cable news and more by habits, dispositions, and practices
that tend toward close relations with others, are spread neighbor to
neighbor, and are imbued by an immediate culture that questions
reality and demands explanation—even if the question is why is it
always my turn to pick up the kids.140
Stout’s prescription for civic engagement is familiar to those
experienced in community organizing, where face-to-face encounters
form the foundation for collective action and power. Indeed, Edward
Chambers, executive director of the Industrial Areas Foundation
(IAF), one of the most prominent community-organizing networks in
141
the nation, has called the “relational meeting” the “most radical
142
thing [we] do.” In IAF parlance, “relational meeting” is a technical
term for building relationships, which leads to issue targets and the
identification of indigenous leaders.143 Before an IAF organization
even formally exists, organizers and initial leaders conduct up to ten
144
thousand of such meetings over three to four years. A skilled
organizer uses a relational meeting not to sell or push an issue, but to
listen and ask short succinct questions in hopes of eliciting anecdotes
and personal narratives, which reveal the underpinnings of one’s
motivation or lack of motivation.145 Chambers explains:
The relational meeting is the entry point to public life. . . .
. . . [It] isn’t chitchat, like the usual informal exchange over coffee
or drinks. In casual meetings, we take people as they present
themselves. We don’t push. We don’t dig. We don’t ask why or
where a notion came from. We don’t probe an idea. We don’t raise
possibilities. We don’t ask questions that engage the imagination:

139. Id. at 293 (footnote omitted).
140. See id. at 302 (“[W]hat we have going for us as a community[] are valued social
practices and the forms of excellence they involve. We care about soccer, about how the pizzas
and tortillas are made, and about having our voices heard in town hall. We want to hold each
other responsible for commitments and actions, so we talk about them. We debate the merits of
center forwards, anchovies, and school board candidates.”).
141. MARK R. WARREN, DRY BONES RATTLING 6–9 (2001).
142. EDWARD T. CHAMBERS, ROOTS FOR RADICALS 13 (2006).
143. Id. at 46, 49.
144. Id. at 48.
145. Id. at 50–51.
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“Well, what if you looked at it this way?” “How would your parents
have reacted?” “How would you feel if you were the other
person?” . . . .
The relational meeting . . . is an attempt to find the other’s center.
. . . Stories like these don’t rest on the surface, to be picked up in
casual chatter. Only concerted and intentional encounters will bring
146
them to light.

Mark Warren, an anthropologist who has studied the IAF
method extensively, concludes that relational meetings work for IAF
because “[i]t is in community connections that individuals can
develop the will to act collectively.”147 Moreover, “[w]hen people are
placed in interdependent situations where they believe that they need
each other, they forego initial prejudices and enact cross-ethnic and
cross-racial helping.”148 The “challenge,” he argues, “is to create these
interdependent and cooperative forms.”149
The American workplace is well suited to Warren’s challenge
because such an interdependent cooperative form already exists: the
labor union. The acute goal, then, is to reorient labor to use IAF-type
relational tactics internally, which political theory suggests and
community organizing shows can incite individuals’ mobilization and
create opportunities for collective action. In short, unions must be
transformed into what Stout terms a “community of reason-givers,”150
with members and officials discussing internal union matters honestly,
seriously, and often.
The rise of social movement unionism, in combination with
151
Professor Markowitz’s research, suggests that the newest generation
of union members may be especially receptive to internal relational
tactics. But member receptivity may not be enough. Union officials
may need to be compelled to initiate relational contact in the vein of
radical democratic theory and IAF practice.
Nationalized right-to-work might obligate just such a
commitment. Right-to-work at a national level, when viewed not as a

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
WARREN, supra note 141, at 23.
Id. at 27.
Id.
STOUT, supra note 138, at 293.
See supra notes 116–28 and accompanying text.
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demoralizing drain on resources but as an opportunity for relation
renewal, could drastically reframe the consciousness of union officials
and the implicit expectations of union membership. The tactics used
and the culture shaped by Las Vegas’s Local 226 and UE Local 1111
would no longer be anomalous, but the rule. National right-to-work
would institutionalize interior relation building, which would
institutionalize interior activism, which would, in turn, institutionalize
stronger unions.152
C. UPS Teamsters
The union culture at United Parcel Service (UPS) exemplifies
this progression. UPS is a large global company with a unionized
workforce that spans right-to-work and union security states alike.153
As public policy professor Robert Putnam, who has studied UPS’s
154
employee culture, observes, “UPS exemplifies relational work.”
Putnam’s word choice is deliberate. “Relational work” is a technical
reference to IAF organizing philosophy.155 Indeed, Putnam compares
UPS union practices to the community-organizing techniques

152. This Note does not suggest that right-to-work laws embody some intangible power that
morphs the interactions of union members and officials. There are many unions in right-to-work
states that are weak, dysfunctional and hobbled by noncontributing free-riders. See, e.g.,
Catherine Meeker, Defining “Ministerial Aid”: Union Decertification Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1001–02 (1999) (“[O]ver the last four decades, employees
have used union decertification petitions with increasing frequency and success.” (footnote
omitted)). These unions probably do poor relational work, have been largely abandoned by the
national labor movement, and the presence of right-to-work does little to provoke a change in
their tactics. What this Note does posit is that if right-to-work were extended nationally, labor as
a whole would have the utmost incentive to overhaul its internal strategies in a universal and
intentional manner. The most likely and effective strategic shift, it is argued, would be reform in
the vein of IAF practice and radical democratic theory. The widespread acceptance of social
movement unionism as an organizing model would make this shift easier than at any time in
history. See, e.g., FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 88, at 131 (“[T]he vision of labor evoked by
social movement unionism is entirely different than the one conjured up by business
unionism . . . . [I]t allows organizers to evoke a new vision of unionism . . . .”). This would
require extreme tactical changes and perhaps large training costs. But some unions have already
implemented IAF-type internal strategies successfully in the right-to-work environment. See
discussion supra Part III.A. They are thriving. That may—in part—be attributable to member
servicing and activism pressures exerted by right-to-work itself. Ultimately, this Note speculates
that the long-term benefits of hundreds of newly responsive unions and millions of newly
activist and radicalized unionists would outweigh the short-term costs of internal union reform.
153. UPS has 370,000 employees world-wide. The company’s drivers and package sorters
and loaders are unionized at its various hubs and commercial locations. ROBERT D. PUTNUM &
LEWIS M. FELDSTONE, BETTER TOGETHER 210–11 (2003).
154. Id. at 212.
155. See supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text.
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employed successfully by Valley Interfaith, the IAF affiliate in
156
southern Texas. Indeed, UPS Teamsters expect and institutionalize
face-to-face conversation:
Every morning, in every UPS hub and center, drivers gather for a
brief prework communication meeting, or PCM, before they go out
on the road. Every day, all around the country, drivers meet at
lunchtime in parks and parking lots to talk, mixing social
conversation with work: veterans help newcomers find obscure
addresses or solve other problems; the drivers exchange missorted
packages or balance their remaining loads to make sure everything
gets delivered on time. . . .
A lot of conversation takes the form of storytelling. . . . Veteran
drivers recount tales of their early difficulties to encourage
newcomers and to communicate some of the tricks of the trade.
They also recall the veterans who shared stories with them when
they were new: the tales, for instance, of winter deliveries in rural
Wisconsin that includes tips for preventing ice from forming on the
steering wheel and how you are likely to find your farmer-customers
157
at different places, depending on the weather.

Such relational work has led to what Putnam describes as an
almost unprecedented culture of internal cohesion: “Tales of
cooperation are part of the company’s folklore. . . . [T]he brown
uniform worn by every driver represents membership in a collective
158
In turn, as IAF
enterprise, commonality over individuality.”
philosophy and radical democratic theory predict, internal relation
building has catalyzed external and internal activism at UPS. Putnam
quotes Linda Kaboolian, a labor relations expert specializing in the
history of the Teamsters: “[E]mployee groups and union locals are
very active in civic life—there is a real occupational community
among UPS workers. Historically, there has been more union
democracy and less corruption in UPS locals than in other parts of the
Teamsters.”159
The 1997 national UPS Teamsters strike epitomized how internal
relation building, sparking activism, can translate into union strength.
The catalyst for the strike itself was a testament to the unity and

156.
157.
158.
159.

PUTNUM & FELDSTONE, supra note 153, at 212.
Id. at 212–13.
Id. at 211–12.
Id. at 216.
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selflessness of UPS union members across the country, as full-time
workers stood with their colleagues not over an issue central to their
own work-life, but to demand that UPS improve the lives of part
160
timers by converting them to full time. With the strike fund nearly
empty and facing one of the largest and most profitable employers in
the country, business analysts predicted the union’s collapse.161
Yet an already united and activist workforce schooled in the
fundamentals of relational organizing uniquely prepared the union.162
As the New York Times reported, “By the time the July 31 strike
deadline approached, the teamsters had turned their UPS
membership into a Juggernaut that the company’s executives
163
underestimated.” Indeed, 95 percent of the workers voted to strike,
and only a few thousand workers crossed the picket lines.164 The result
was a resounding labor triumph, the first in many years.165 UPS agreed
to transform ten thousand part-time jobs into full-time positions, to
raise part-time starting pay for the first time in fifteen years, and to
discard a major pension change the union had strongly opposed.166 In
return, the union acceded only to the company’s desire for a five-year
167
collective bargaining agreement.
For the UPS Teamsters, an ingrained practice of member
activism, cultivating a tradition of cooperation and cohesion shaped

160. See id. at 217 (“Drivers and package handlers struck in part to demand that UPS
convert more part-time jobs to full time.”).
161. See NATHAN NEWMAN, CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. RESEARCH, WHY VICTORY AT UPS
MATTERS (1997), http://www.nathannewman.org/other/why_ups_strike_matters.html. (“So this
is the situation Carey faced in this strike: an empty strike fund, his own leadership under a
cloud, and facing one of the largest employers in the country backed by flush bank accounts
and . . . $1 billion in profits the year before. Before the strike started, there were a number of
pundit analyses that the Teamsters were doomed if they went on strike since their internal
collapse or financial exhaustion of their strike fund would quickly kill them off.”).
162. See Steven Greenhouse, Yearlong Effort Key to Success for Teamsters, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1997, at A1 (“Though it was four months before their contract expired, four months
before a strike deadline, these workers in Saddle Brook, like those at rallies in 30 other cities
around the country that morning, were already gung-ho volunteers in the teamsters’ efforts to
mobilize members to stand up to U.P.S. . . . The teamsters’ yearlong mobilization included
scores of rallies at U.P.S. sites as well as other major efforts, like sending questionnaires to
185,000 teamsters asking what they wanted from the U.P.S. negotiations and collecting 100,000
signatures backing the union’s demands. But the union did not neglect minor details: at one
point, it distributed 50,000 whistles for use at the rallies.”).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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the union into a formidable collective force. Fundamentally, however,
an established union is a bureaucracy, and it is reasonable to question
if a constant undercurrent of collective activism is possible or even
168
desirable in such a setting.
D. The Possibility of Sustained Internal Activism
Sustained internal union activism is possible. As Linda
Markowitz notes at the conclusion of her study, activism within a
bureaucracy requires skills different from those applicable to a
strategic social movement.169 Thus, activists must be taught not only
how to win a campaign, but how to properly orient a union to
seamlessly transfer energies to more bureaucratic yet equally critical
tasks.170
For unions, proper orientation embodies two components. First,
face-to-face interaction must be conceived not as a burdensome
administrative task or just another union picnic, but as a continuing
opportunity for relationship renewal and member activation.
Sociologist Steven Lopez, for instance, describes a union’s successful
efforts to survive after a company had unilaterally suspended dues
deductions:
If dues could not be collected, the union would appear in an
important sense to have ceased to exist. But instead of lamenting the
lack of dues deduction, the union viewed collecting dues one on one
as an opportunity for continuing the face-to-face interaction that
kept it together during the darkest days of the [initial organizing]
171
struggle.

Second, an incessant current of activism requires a constant
simmering of minor conflict. Having examined the interaction
between union culture and worker mobilization, sociologist Rick
Fantasia notes that “cultures of solidarity are formed out of friction

168. See SULTAN, supra note 133, at 119 (“[T]he union begins as a protest movement. There
is excitement and drama as the union strives for membership and recognition. The interest and
participation of members are high, as each new member knows he can help determine the
character and destiny of the organization. But over time, grass-roots participation diminishes,
and union meetings lose their early New England town-meeting characteristics. Once the
union’s survival is no longer in serious doubt, once it is recognized as a permanent institution in
the plant, the stimulus for participation in the day-to-day affairs of the union decreases.”).
169. MARKOWITZ, supra note 116, at 162.
170. Id.
171. LOPEZ, supra note 90, at 193.
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and opposition itself. That is, solidarity is to a considerable degree
172
formed and intensified in interaction with the opposition.” Fantasia
does not promote unbridled or open antagonism. Rather, he hints at a
crucial element of sustained union vigor: the urgent awareness that
the workplace, left unchecked, naturally tends against workers’
safety, rights, and freedom.173 In turn, a union bureaucracy that
enables activism ensures that workers both identify employer
coercion and understand that struggles do not cease with certification
and a contract.174 Lopez, for instance, describes a union that
established a twenty-four-hour hotline for workers to report unfair
labor practices or Occupational Safety and Health Administration
violations.175 Once union leaders encouraged the hotline’s use, the
system ensured that the employer’s potential to infringe rights
remained central in workers’ minds,176 promoting an everyday friction
that Fantasia would argue stokes solidarity and action.
The right-to-work environment may produce a similar effect. As
right-to-work pressures union officials to dramatize the services they
provide to justify dues,177 the officials may implicitly (or explicitly)
project an “us-versus-them” oppositional framework. Workers, in
turn, may slowly internalize this mentality, cementing an atmosphere
of slight but omnipresent tension.
More critically, right-to-work begs a perpetual, internal question
for union members: “Why pay dues?” Although the answer to this
question is important, the act of answering is more so; participation in
the “community of reason-givers” begins when a union official crafts

172. RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY 233 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
173. See id. at 232 (“[T]he forms of collective action by workers were to a significant degree
shaped and influenced by the structures and practices of institutional life that dominate labor
relations in American society. The issues over which workers sometimes risked their livelihood
were not drawn from an abstract ideological agenda but were things they felt they could
reasonably achieve, based on the rights that were codified in, or closely related to, those
bureaucratic structures and practices. . . . In the process, workers then engaged in new forms of
activity (militant, direct action), created new associational bonds in practical forms (essentially
emergent social movements), and developed new-found values of mutual solidarity (a new sense
of ‘us,’ a new sense of ‘them,’ . . .).”).
174. See LOPEZ, supra note 90, at 193 (“The first task of continuing internal mobilization
and organization was to convey to the rank and file . . . that the struggle was continuing, that
there was important work for them to do.”).
175. Id. at 194.
176. Id.
177. See SULTAN, supra note 133, at 124 (“Right-to-work legislation undoubtedly imposes
pressures on union leadership to dramatize the ‘service’ performed by the union. This process in
turn encourages aggressive union behavior.”).
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a thoughtful, reasoned response. The question arising again and again
among many actors sustains the community. This repetitive back-andforth exchange, Stout and other radical democrats would assert, is the
very engine of mobilization.
E. The Desirability of Sustained Internal Activism
A sustained current of intraunion activism is not just possible, it
is also desirable. This Note has already recounted some historical,
theoretical, and narrative evidence in support of that desirability, but
a broader explanation remains, one that suggests an exotic, infectious
quality of collective action. The experience of collective action
stimulates and transforms workers. As Fantasia maintains, “[I]n
collective action . . . something new is created . . . . An emergent
culture is created in which new values are incubated, new forms of
activity generated, and an associational bond of a new type
formed.”178
This phenomenon is apparent in Fantasia’s anatomy of two
wildcat strikes at a small New Jersey iron foundry, Taylor Casting, in
179
Using a meticulously catalogued first-person
the mid-1970s.
narrative, Fantasia shows how the shape of the second strike was
180
largely “a function of the process manifested in the first.” That is, in
the later strike workers appeared not only to have learned from the
181
first action, but some were concretely transformed by it. Indeed,
Fantasia details how workers in the second strike did not commit to
solidarity spontaneously, as in the first strike.182 Rather, the day
before the action occurred, workers secured tentative solidarity
commitments from colleagues in areas of the factory not directly
affected by the primary grievance and coordinated their dress on the
183
morning of the second strike. Fantasia cites these differences as
evidence of maturing collective tactics gained through experience.184
Moreover, new union leaders emerged and solidarity was achieved
178. FANTASIA, supra note 172, at 174.
179. Id. at ix, 75.
180. Id. at 100.
181. See id. (“The dynamic shifted as workers came together and as company tactics
changed in light of emergent (and expanded) expressions of solidarity.”).
182. Id. at 99–100.
183. Id. at 100.
184. See id. (“Essentially, it seems that solidarity and successful collective action in the later
strike were made easier by what the men had learned from the success (and drama) of the
first.”).
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185
more quickly in the second strike. The four workers who catalyzed
the second action enthusiastically participated in the first strike, but
were not instigators; by January, however, they were ready to
186
embrace leadership roles. Fantasia hints at the deep relational
implications of this transformative experience:

Two of them worked closely together on a daily basis (as
inspectors), but the other two (a welder and a heat-treatment
furnace operator) worked at opposite ends of the department and
had previously had little contact with each other . . . . Race and
ethnicity were not binding elements; two of the workers were black,
187
one white, and the other Hispanic.

Fantasia’s analysis of the two strikes adds credence to the
hypothesis that shop-floor relational banter, embedded in the Taylor
Casting employment experience as workers interacted with one
another constantly throughout the day, can lead to incipient
solidarity.188 At Taylor, this solidarity translated to overt activism on
two otherwise ordinary mornings. Through an organic process of
interrelation, an ad hoc leadership hierarchy took shape, and activist
energy swelled among the broader workforce.
Of course, relational organizing at Taylor Casting should not
have arisen organically; it should not have been merely a fortuitous
byproduct of workers’ arrangement on the factory floor. Union
leadership should have planned, practiced, and promoted it. Instead,
though effective, the strikes at Taylor highlighted a drastic disconnect
between the union’s formal and informal leadership,189 a ripe target
for future exploitation by management. The strikes were also illegal.190

185. Id. at 99–100.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 100–01.
188. See id. at 92 (“[T]he conditions of work and the day-to-day social interaction they
shaped created at least a surface level of mutuality, a foundation of trust among the workers.”).
189. See id. (“The wildcat strike brought into sharp focus the day-to-day relationship
between rank-and-file workers and the union leadership.”).
190. In both strikes a minority of the bargaining unit stopped working without prior
knowledge or authorization from their majority representatives. Id. at 89, 96–97. Minority
strikes are not protected by the Act. 2 ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1487 (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgins Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2001). In
both strikes workers also remained on the employer’s property during the strike. FANTASIA,
supra note 172, at 88, 97. This was also likely unprotected by the Act. ABA SECTION OF LABOR
& EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra, at 1486; see NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgicial Corp., 306 U.S. 240,
255–57 (1939) (“Here the strike was illegal in its inception and prosecution. . . . It was an illegal
seizure of the building . . . .”).
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Alternatively, had the official union leadership been committed
to internal relational organizing in the months and years prior to the
first wildcat, solidarity and energy would have still resulted, but it
could have been harnessed strategically toward methodic collectivism,
practiced within the bounds of the collective bargaining agreement.
This Note demonstrates that the introduction of nationalized right-towork, combined with a union movement primed to take advantage of
what the right-to-work environment requires relationally for unions to
thrive, might institutionalize this scenario. When right-to-work is
viewed not as a bureaucratic albatross but as an opportunity for
intentional relational commitments, the resulting practices double as
intensive preparation for future collective actions.
CONCLUSION
The “grand bargain” cannot be separated from its two
underlying idealisms. First, workers who want to form a union
community should not have to weigh incredible odds, a bulwark of
legal impediments, and the possibility of personal financial
destruction before they even begin. Second, true community leaves
no room for involuntary members.
But in states with union security, labor law facilitates the reverse:
the campaign is hellish, and later, membership is guaranteed. And in
right-to-work states, labor law is simply punitive: the campaign is
hellish, and later, membership may evaporate.
The grand bargain of this Note reworks both scenarios,
presuming that the toughest union work should be reserved not for
the beginning of a campaign, but after its conclusion. Prior to
recognition, a worker should face a single choice, unfettered and
without anxiety: “To sign or not to sign?” After recognition, a worker
should face hundreds of difficult choices: “How on earth am I going
to arrange all of these relational meetings?” In Beloved Community,
Professor Charles Marsh denotes this latter struggle—which also
confronted the civil rights movement—as the “more difficult work” of
sustaining that follows the merely “difficult work”191 of creating: “the
daily disciplines and sacrifices required to sustain beloved
community. . . . begin[] . . . in a whole lot of waiting around for car

191. See CHARLES MARSH, THE BELOVED COMMUNITY 5 (2005) (“The new legions of
Christian radicals working in rural and urban areas remind us of the sobering fact that beyond
the difficult work of achieving legal equality awaits more difficult work . . . .”).
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rides, in tedious organizational meetings and arguments about
192
strategy, around the mimeograph machine.”
A union’s “more difficult work” encompasses Marsh’s talk of
carpooling and copying, but also the ribaldry of a buzzing union hall
and its constituent parts: the scribbled events calendar, the old
confetti lodged in a matted carpet that could use a good steam
cleaning, the concrete walls adorned with memories of events and
193
people past, and the ever-evolving phone tree. Through it all, the
essence of union community is revealed.
Of course, such “work” does not come naturally to all unions.
Just as Stout believes accountable relationships can cure a political
194
culture that cultivates bad democrats, so too might they cure a
union culture that cultivates bad unionists. When properly conceived,
a prime incubator for such relationships may be the right-to-work
environment. Proving that has been the primary challenge of this
Note.
Rick Fantasia’s conclusion that “the character of the labor
movement in the United States [is] . . . crucial in determining much of
the shape and content of collective actions by workers”195 is not
rhetorical filling. It is a challenge, one that summons a slew of simple
diagnostic questions: How many relational meetings are automatically
scheduled for new hires? Which and how many committees are they
expected to join? What are their responsibilities in the union hall? If
the union across town strikes, how many extra meals should be
prepared for the strikers’ families?
Organized workers can pursue better wages, better benefits,
more fairness, and more dignity. But to be actually effective as a
union, they must pursue an internal, relational community. These
questions simply point to some natural expectations of a functioning
relational community. In such an environment, that workers could

192. Id. (footnote omitted).
193. See FANTASIA, supra note 172, at 243–44 (“The union presence at the local level must
be experienced as more than a bureaucratic labyrinth through which grievances are channeled;
the union hall should be a rich center of cultural life and education that cultivates traditions and
practices of solidarity.”).
194. See STOUT, supra note 138, at 303–04 (“The kind of community that democrats should
be promoting . . . involves shared commitment to the Constitution and the culture of
democracy. . . . [I]ts central and definitive component is the discursive practice of holding one
another responsible for the actions we commit, the commitments we undertake, and the sorts of
people we become.”).
195. FANTASIA, supra note 172, at 239.
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technically “opt out” of the community is not a relevant
consideration. They will have as many reasons as relationships not to.

